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IN T H E UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

VERONICA LEE JACOBSEN,
Appellant.
v.

GUENTHER JACOBSEN
Appellee.

Appeal No.: 20080802-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) and UT. CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(h) provide this Court with
jurisdiction over this appeal resulting from the Final Decree of Divorcefiledon August 25, 2008
(the "Decree"), (exhibit A) entered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, presiding.
CONSTITUTIONAL A N D STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED O N APPEAL. A N D STANDARD OF REVIEW
I S S U E I:

Did the trial court err in finding that the Divorce Agreement was an enforceable agreement?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We determine the existence of a contract. . .by resorting to
principles of law; therefore, we grant no deference to the trial court that originally decided
the matter." Carter v. Sorenson. 2004 UT 33, 116, 90 P.3d 637; see, Nunley v. Westates
Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100,1117, 989 P.2d 1077. "Whether a contract exists between
parties is a question of law; therefore, we review the trial court's conclusion of law under a
1

correction of error standard." Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. v. Quintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583
(Utah App. 1992), citing Bailey v. Call. 767 P.21d 138, 139 (Utah App), cert denied, Illy P.2d 45
(Utah 1989); accord, Scarf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). "In determining
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's findings, c[w]e review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings and affirm if there is a
reasonable basis for doing so."' Ockey v. Lehmer. 2008 UT 37, lf34, 189 P.3 51, citing
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah App 1993); see also, Grayson Roper
Ltd. P'ship v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
I S S U E II:
Alternatively, if the Divorce Agreement is enforceable, did the trial court err in offsetting the
proceeds for the sale of the Terra Vista home, under what it found to be an enforceable agreement, with
monies paid for the purpose of retiring the mortgage when (a) the agreement had been in effect for 2years prior
to such payments being made; (b) the plain language of the agreement indicated that, absent a pay-out in
September of 2004, the equity would be divided equally among the parties upon properly sale closure and (c)
did it err in determining that Appellee's prior inheritance monies which he paid into the Terra Vista home be
returned to him in full?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Interpretation of contract terms is a question of law."
Holladay Duplex Management Co.. L.L.C. v. Howells. 2002 UT App 125, 112, 47 P.3d 104,
citing Canyon Meadows. 2001 UT App 414, 1J7, 40 P.3d 1148; see also, Dixon v. Pro Image.
Inc.. 1999 UT 89, Hi4, 987 P.2d 48. "We review the trial court's rulings on questions of law
for correctness." Id., see, Canyon Meadows at H7. "[T]he trial court has wide discretion in
property division, and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of
discretion can be demonstrated." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 305-306 (Utah
1988).
I S S U E I I I : Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee equity in house for payments made pursuant to
the Divorce Agreement following signing of agreement up to and including the sale of the Terra Vista
properly; awarding Appellee all interest accrued on the escrow containing the proceeds from the sale of the
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Terra Vista property; and did the trial court enter conflicting findings in determining that the parties
separated their financial accounts in May 2001 ?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "p]he trial court has wide discretion in property division,
and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be
demonstrated." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 305-306 (Utah 1988).
I S S U E IV: Did the trial court err in using the new values (instead of depreciated values) for major
household items and the 2002 VW Golf in ordering Veronica to pay Guenther one half the value of those
items?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[T]he trial court has wide discretion in property division,
and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be
demonstrated." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 305-306 (Utah 1988).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL A N D STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.

U.C.A. § 30-3-3(1)
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE

The parties met in Decatur, Alabama, on December 12, 2006, while both were
working for Hexcel Corporation, and were married on April 18, 1997. R0393 at pp. 7-8. On
June 2, 1997, appellant Veronica Jacobsen ("Veronica") moved to Kearns, Utah (hereinafter,
the "Gingerwood Home"), to live with appellee Guenther Jacobsen ("Guenther").

Id.

The Gingerwood Home in Kearns, Utah, was owned by Guenther at that time. Id. at p. 44.
Veronica resigned her position in Alabama making approximately $46,000 per year, and sold
her home for a profit of $6,000, which was placed in a joint account. Id. at pp. 10-11.
In 1999, the couple began construction on a home in Sandy (hereinafter, the "Terra
Vista Home"), mortgaging the Gingerwood Home for approximately $60,000 to purchase
3

the lot in Sandy, which cost approximately $81,000. R0393 at pp. 43-44, 48. The remaining
$21,000 came from the couple's joint account. Id. at 45. Veronica's name was placed on the
Gingerwood Home on or about June 18th or 19th, 1999, so the parties could purchase the lot
for the Terra Vista Home. Id. at 45-46. In October of 1999, the couple fired their contractor
and Veronica managed the remainder of the construction until its completion in April of
2000. Id. at 48. The sale of the Gingerwood Home reflects both Veronica and Guenther as
owners and sellers. Id. at p. 47.
On May 14, 2001, the parties signed and notari2ed a one page document titled Divorce
Agreement (the "Divorce Agreement"), which reflected the parties' agreements to
distribution of some property. R0077. The Divorce Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit
"B" and incorporated herein by this reference. Approximately three and one half years later,
on October 13, 2005, Veronica, filed a Petition for Divorce (the "Petition"), requesting the
termination of her marriage to Guenther. R0001. Concerning the Terra Vista Home,
Veronica requested that (a) Guenther be awarded the Terra Vista Home; (b) Veronica be
entitled to one-half the value of the equity in the Terra Vista home valued at the time of the
Decree of Divorce by a certified appraiser of Veronica's choosing, and; (c) Veronica be
ordered to sign a Quit Claim Deed for the Terra Vista Home within ten (10) days of entry of
the Decree of Divorce and (d) Guenther be ordered to pay Veronica one-half of the equity
within thirty (30) days of the entry of the Decree of Divorce. R0003. The Petition did not
seek alimony from Guenther conditioned on Guenther performing certain requests.

On

October 26, 2005, Guenther filed his Answer and Counterclaim. R0011. Concerning the Terra
Vista Home, Guenther requested that, based on the parties' separation in January 2003, it
4

was just for the parties to be awarded equity based upon the value of the equity accrued from
the time they moved into the residence until their separation on or about January 1, 2003.
R0015. Guenther requested the value be determined by a mutually agreed upon appraiser. Id.
On October 3, 2006, the parties came before Commissioner Patrick T. Casey for a
pretrial settlement conference. R0218. The commissioner determined mediation had failed,
the parties were unable to resolve the issues, and certified the matter for trial. Id. The
commissioner determined the following issues for trial: (1) Veronica's claim for one-half the
equity in the Terra Vista Home and how the Divorce Agreement applies thereto, which was
further complicated by other factors; (2) the parties' vehicles and Veronica's request for
balancing of the values in the vehicles; (3) the financial accounts and their valuation dates to
be divided equally; (4) Veronica's request for alimony, particularly since she experiences a
shortfall every month; (5) the issue of the repayment of monies taken from the financial
account; and (6) attorney's fees. R0218-0220, 0223.
On January 31, 2007, the Petition came for trial (the "Trial"). R0393 - Tr. at p. 3. On
February 2, 2007, the trial court rendered its oral findings. R0277. The trial court concluded
that the Divorce Agreement was an enforceable agreement and determined to enforce it.
R0394 at p. 3. The trial court based this conclusion on its findings that (a) Veronica testified
that the Divorce Agreement was her idea, she drafted it, and both parties appeared before a
notary to sign it; (b) Veronica testified she had no specific immediate intent to implement the
Divorce Agreement, but previously attempted to fill out paperwork for divorce; (c)
Veronica's child Isaac required a secure place to live until he completed High School; and,
(d) while the Divorce Agreement did not address all of the parties' financial assets, it did
5

address a substantial number of assets and how they should be distributed. Id. at pp. 4-5.
The trial court found that there was performance on the Divorce Agreement by the
parties. R0394 at p. 5. Veronica's name was removed from the Terra Vista Home's mortgage,
Guenther continued to make monthly mortgage payments and, while Veronica temporarily
moved to Hong Kong, Isaac remained in the Terra Vista Home until August 2004. Id, at pp.
5-6. Hence, the trial court concluded elements of the contract had been met in that both
parties participated in the drafting and revision of the Divorce Agreement and had reached a
meeting of the minds. Id. at p. 6. The trial court found that the lack of an actual filing of a
divorce action did not take away from the enforceability of the contract and, since the
Divorce Agreement did not provide a precise date by which the Terra Vista Home was to be
sold, that there would be equal division of equity whenever the sale occurred. Id. at pp. 6-8.
The trial court found that the way in which the parties filed their tax returns after
signing the Divorce Agreement demonstrated the parties' intent to keep their finances
separate. Id. at p. 9. The trial court found that the distribution of the 401-K and pension
plans was contemplated by the Divorce Agreement, which indicates that they would be
divided equally. Id. Furthermore, the Divorce Agreement disclaimed Veronica's right to
seek alimony. Id. While the trial court noted the Divorce Agreement does not make
provisions concerning the distribution of personal property, including stock options, this
failure did not take away from the Divorce Agreement's enforceability, since it in large
measure addressed the distribution of assets. Id.
The trial court determined that Veronica was effectively gifted with one-half the value
of the Gingerwood Home, irrespective of the fact that Guenther had paid for it in full before
6

the marriage. R0394 at p. 10. Hence, the trial court found that the Gingerwood Home was
marital property and thus went into the interest of the Terra Vista Home. Id. at pp. 10-11.
The trial court concluded that the joint accounts became separate after May 2001,
when Veronica began depositing her paychecks into a different account. R0394 at pp. 11-12.
The trial court found that the parties remained signatories on each other's accounts as a
convenience to Veronica. Id. The trial court concluded that the parties intended to retain
their funds as separate assets after May 25, 2001, and that Veronica acted improperly by
withdrawing money from the joint account. Id. at p. 15. Thus, the trial court held that
Guenther was entitled to deduct the money taken from the account from the equity in the
Terra Vista Home. Id.

The trial court found that Guenther was entitled to the fix-up

expenses he incurred when selling the Terra Vista Home, and that Guenther was entitled to
reimbursement for paying off Veronica's debt when the parties married. Id. at p. 15-16.
Therefore, the trial court concluded that different dates needed to be attached to the valuing
of different assets. R0394 at p. 18. The trial court found that the checking and savings
accounts were separated on May 25, 2001, and monies held in the respective accounts were
separate property of the parties thereafter. Id. at p. 18. The trial court found the valuation of
the Terra Vista Home as of the date of its sale, which was contemplated by the Divorce
Agreement. Id.
The trial court determined that the income tax filings and refunds had already been
divided between the parties equitably. R0394 at p. 20. The trial court determined the value of
stock options and pension as of the date of divorce and awarded each party half interest in
the other's pension and stock options. Id.

The trial court found that Veronica needed
7

minor assistance with her attorney fees and awarded Veronica $2,500 in attorney's fees. Id. at
pp. 20-21.
On June 19, 2008, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw and Order
(the "FOF/COL")

R0367. On August 25, 2008, the Decree was entered. R0401. The

Decree granted the parties divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. R0402.
Veronica's claim to Guenther's inheritance was categorically rejected, including the portion
of inheritance Guenther used to retire the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. Id. The
Divorce Agreement was deemed valid and enforceable, with any ambiguity resolved against
Veronica as the drafter thereof. Veronica was determined to have waived claim to alimony
and denied such request. Id. The date of May 25, 2001, was utilized for the purpose of
separating the joint financial accounts, with Guenther awarded $29,777.20, an amount that
Veronica removed from Guenther's account in . Id. This amount was deducted from
Veronica's share of the sales proceeds of the Terra Vista Home. Id. The date of January 31,
2007, was utilized for the date of valuation for Guenther's stock options accumulated during
the marriage, and each party was awarded one-half the value of the stock as of that date. The
date of January 31, 2007, was also utilized as the date of valuation of the parties' pension
plans, 401ks, and any other retirements. Id. Thus, Veronica was awarded $68,829.64
withdrawn from Guenther's 401k plan and Guenther was ordered to receive one-half of
$12,000 cashed out from Veronica's retirement. Id. The trial court determined Veronica
would receive an offset of $28,414.82 from the monies she was ordered to pay to Guenther
from her share of the sales proceeds of the Terra Vista Home. R0402-0403. The proceeds of

8

the Terra Vista Home sale had been placed in escrow when it sold and amounted to
$488,949.11. R0393atp. 51.
The date of August 17, 2006, which was the Terra Vista Home's date of sale, was
utilized for the division of equity. R0403. The trial court first determined Guenther would
receive $241,465.52 outright from the proceeds, which represented the extra payments he
made to retire the mortgage and one-half the cost of repairs to the home prior to the division
of the sales proceeds. Id, The trial court rewarded the remaining sales proceeds of
$247,483.50 to be divided equally between the parties. Id, However, out of the remaining
sales proceeds, Veronica was ordered to pay Guenther (a) $29,777.29 for the wrongfully
taken money from his account; (b) $4,134.25 as Guenther's one-half interest in the major
personal property retained by Veronica; (c) $5,137.50 as Guenther's one-half interest in the
value of the Vehicle; (d) attorney's fees in the amount of $2,117.50, due to Veronica
removing money as indicated from Guenther's account; and (e) $14,417.21 to reimburse
Guenther for paying her pre-marital debt. Guenther was ordered to pay Veronica $47,417
for her one-half interest in the parties' retirement accounts and stock options, and attorney's
fees in the amount of $2,500. R0403-0404. Hence, the trial court ordered the distribution of
the Terra Vista Home escrow in the amount of $117,914.38 to Veronica and $371,034.72 to
Guenther. R0404. On September 22, 2008, Veronica filed her Notice of Appeal, R0445.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Material facts relative to each issue are contained in the argument section for each
argument post so as to avoid repetition.

9

SUMMARY OF T H E ARGUMENT
In its analysis of contracts between spouses, this Court has determined the following:
In addressing the stipulated divorce decree between Wife and
Husband, we first "acknowledge[ ] the general authority of
spouses ... to arrange property rights by a contract that is
recogni2ed and enforced by a court in the event of a divorce."
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75,1f24, 984 P.2d 987. And although the
Utah Supreme Court has held that "contracts between spouses
... are not necessarily judged on the same terms as contracts
executed by persons operating at 'arm's length,"' we note that
the court never set forth a different test or standard of review
for such contracts. Id. Instead, the court has stated the general
principle that "spouses ... may make binding contracts with each
other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the
negotiations are conducted in good faith ... and do not
unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory
duties." Id. at ^25. In effect, the parties "are held to the highest
degree of good faith, honesty, and candor," and "agreements
concerning the disposition of property owned by the parties at
the time of their marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud,
coercion, or material nondisclosure." Id. at ^[24 (quotations and
citation omitted).
Sweetv. Sweet 2006 UT App. 216, f3,138 P.3d 63.
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[a] binding contract can exist only where there
has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms."
BunneU v. Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) citing AUen v. Bissinger and
Co.. 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 31 A.L.R. 376.
In May of 2001, the parties signed the document tided "Divorce Agreement."
However, the parties did not end their relationship, and Veronica did not actuaUy file for
divorce until October of 2005. When this matter came before the trial court, the Divorce
Agreement was held to be a binding and enforceable contract, and the division of the marital
10

property was made accordingly.

However, the trial court's reliance upon the Divorce

Agreement was in error as the Divorce Agreement was not entered into in contemplation of
divorce as is evidenced throughout the brief, and was not made in good faith by the parties.
However, should this Court determine that the Divorce Agreement is enforceable,
then the trial court erred in offsetting the proceeds from the sale of the Terra Vista Home.
This Court has held, "[i]t is [a] court's duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as
expressed in the plain language of the covenants." Holladay Duplex Management Co.. L.L.C
v. Howells. 2002 UT App 125, 117, 47 P.3d 104, citing Swenson v. Erickson. 2000 UT 16,
1111, 998 P.2d 807. "Furthermore, [s]uch language is to be taken in its ordinary and generally
understood and popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical refinement nor the
words torn from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon." Id,, citing
Freeman v. Gee. 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155,163 (1967).
Under the Divorce Agreement, Veronica's name was to be kept on the Terra Vista
property, her name was to be removed from the mortgage, Guenther was to make all
payments on the mortgage at least through August 2004, and (under 3.1) the equity was to be
split "equally" when the Terra Vista house was sold.

Under the plain language of the

Divorce Agreement, any payment made by Guenther to the Terra Vista property was a gift
to the marriage. The trial court decided, however, to award Guenther an offset for paying
off the mortgage, and for improvements and maintenance he claimed on the home. Veronica
was given no offset for her maintenance and improvements on the home, and the Divorce
Agreement had no provision for giving credit for payments made on the property. The trial
court's decision to give Guenther equity credit for additional payments he made to the Terra
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Vista home ignored the plain language of the Divorce Agreement, and ignored the fact of
Veronica and he holding the tide joindy as husband and wife. The trial court's decision
denied Veronica the benefit of the bargain she made with the Divorce Agreement.
This Court has stated that, ". . .the doctrine of construing ambiguities in a contract
against the drafter functions as a kind of tie-breaker, used as a last resort by the fact-finder
after the receipt and consideration of all pertinent extrinsic evidence has left unresolved what
the parties actually intended." Wilburn v. Interstate Elec. 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App.
1988). In the instant matter, the fact that Veronica was the drafter of the Divorce Agreement
has been construed against her, even though the parties agreed to an agreement in the form
later changed and countered by Guenther. The mere fact that Veronica drafted the initial
agreement—later countered when Guenther made changes to such agreement—should not
be held against her.
This Court has held that, "Utah law provides that a spouse may transfer his or her
interest in separately acquired property into the marital estate." Bradford v. Bradford. 1999
UT App. 373, 1J22, 993 P.2d 887 citing UT. CODE ANN. §30-2-3. Bradford continues, "[a]
transfer of otherwise separate property to a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is
generally presumed to be a gift, see 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 103(a), at 397 (1991) {citing
Kramer v. Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157,159 (Mo.Ct.App.1986)), and, when coupled with an evident
intent to do so, effectively changes the nature of that property to marital property." Id., citing
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 307-08 (Utah 1988). In the instant matter, the trial
court erred in giving Guenther the amount of all payments he made to the Terra Vista
property, including those stemming from his inheritance, as an offset on the marital property
12

because any payments made to the marital property changed the nature of those payments
into marital property.
"Generally, in a divorce proceeding c[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to all of
his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.'" Bradford v. Bradford.
1999 UT App. 373, TJ26, 993 P.2d 887 citing Thomas v. Thomas. 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25,
987 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah Ct.App.1999). Hence, "[a]n unequal division of marital property,
however, is only justified when the trial court 'memorialize[s] in commendably detailed
findings' the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Id. at ^f 27. In the
instant matter, the Divorce Agreement contemplated for the equity in the Terra Vista Home
to be split equally, with Guenther paying the mortgage through at least August of 2004.
Therefore, it was an error for the trial court to determine that the Divorce Agreement was
enforceable, but that Guenther should be awarded the payments he made on the mortgage
when the Divorce Agreement anticipated such payments. The trial court also erred in its
division of the interest on the proceeds from the Terra Vista Home and the division of the
parties financial accounts, since such division was also inequitable and not in accordance
with the one-half split as set forth in the Divorce Agreement.
The Trial Court also failed to take into account the evidence actually presented to it
and admitted concerning the current values of marital property and Veronica's car, instead
deciding unilaterally to use 7 year old and 2 year old values, respectively, and forcing
Veronica to pay half those inflated values instead of those current values actually submitted
as evidence. This was an abuse of discretion.
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Veronica should also be awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal, as a prevailing
party on appeal who was awarded her attorney fees by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I.

T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED I N DETERMINING T H E DIVORCE
AGREEMENT WAS VALID A N D BINDING O N T H E PARTIES, A N D
CLAIMING THAT T H E AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
AGAINST VERONICA.

A. The Divorce Agreement is Not Enforceable.
In its analysis of contracts between spouses, this Court has determined the following:
In addressing the stipulated divorce decree between Wife and
Husband, we first "acknowledge[ ] the general authority of
spouses ... to arrange property rights by a contract that is
recogni2ed and enforced by a court in the event of a divorce."
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, f24, 984 P.2d 987. And although the
Utah Supreme Court has held that "contracts between spouses
... are not necessarily judged on the same terms as contracts
executed by persons operating at 'arm's length,'" we note that
the court never set forth a different test or standard of review
for such contracts. Id. Instead, the court has stated the general
principle that "spouses ... may make binding contracts with each
other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the
negotiations are conducted in good faith ... and do not
unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory
duties." Id. at ^[25. In effect, the parties "are held to the highest
degree of good faith, honesty, and candor," and "agreements
concerning the disposition of property owned by the parties at
the time of their marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud,
coercion, or material nondisclosure." Id. at ^f24 (quotations and
citation omitted).
Sweetv. Sweet 2006 UT App. 216, f3,138 P.3d 63.
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[a] binding contract can exist only where there
has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms."
BunneU v. Bilk 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) citing AUen v. Bissinger and
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Co.. 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 31 A.L.R. 376. In Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins.
Exchange, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that, depending on the facts of the case, a
failure of a condition precedent to contract formation necessitates the conclusion that no
contract was ever formed. Ibid, 2008 UT App 315,1J40,193 P.3d 650; see, generally, McBrideWilliams v. Huard. 2004 UT 21, 1113, 94 P.3d 175 (" 'Condition precedent' is defined as an
act or event, other than a lapse of time, that must exist or occur before a duty to perform
something promised arises." (emphasis added)(additional internal quotation marks omitted));
see, e.g., Bilanzich v. Lonetti 2007 UT 26, Ifll n. 4, 160 P.3d 1041 (noting that, under the
facts of that case, "the failure of the condition precedent invalidated the entire [contract]").
In the instant case, the trial court determined to enforce the Divorce Agreement in
determining the distribution of property. The trial court based this determination on the
evidence presented at trial as follows: Veronica testified she left her copy of the Divorce
Agreement with Guenther when she left the Terra Vista Home to reside in Hong Kong.
R0393 at p. 28. Veronica testified that she initiated the draft, but Guenther finalized it. Id. at
p. 30. Veronica testified she wanted the Divorce Agreement because in December of 2000,
Guenther brought home another woman. Id.
A few months later, Veronica asked Guenther to leave, and he moved out in April
2001. R0393 at p. 28. On May 14, 2001, the parties signed the Divorce Agreement.
Guenther was not a citizen of the United States but had applied for a green card at the time
of the Divorce Agreement. R0393 at p. 28. Veronica had participated with Guenther in
applying for the green card. Id. However, Veronica became worried about Guenther's exgirlfriend in Germany. Id. at pp. 30-31. Veronica did not see a divorce lawyer after signing
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the Divorce Agreement and was unaware whether Guenther had seen a lawyer. Id. at p. 31.
Veronica did not intend to divorce Guenther at the time she signed the Divorce Agreement.
Id. Veronica testified that, after signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther was nicer to her
than before. Id. at p. 32. Veronica testified she was worried Guenther had used her to obtain
a green card. Id.
Veronica testified that Guenther removed her name from the first mortgage on the
Terra Vista Home, which is in accordance with the Divorce Agreement. R0393 at pp. 32-33.
Veronica testified that Guenther moved back into the Terra Vista Home when she moved to
Hong Kong in January of 2003. Id. p. 34. Prior to moving to Hong Kong, Veronica paid the
utility bills and maintenance concerning the Terry Vista Home. Id. Veronica and Guenther
shared the costs of any damage to the Terra Vista Home. Id. at pp. 34-35. Terra Vista was
not placed for sale until November 2005, a month after Veronica filed for divorce. Id.
At the time the parties signed the Divorce Agreement, there was no discussion
between the parties concerning a reduction of what Veronica received by an amount of
Guenther's inheritance. R0393 at pp. 35-36. The parties did not discuss any reduction in
what Veronica would receive from the sale of Terra Vista based on use of premarital or
separate funds. Id. at p. 36.

Veronica testified that, after Guenther moved out in April

2001, she saw him at the Terra Vista Home once every weekend or more. Id.
Veronica gave Guenther her copy of the Divorce Agreement when she left for Hong
King because she considered it "meaningless." Id. at pp. 36-37. Veronica testified that,
although they were separated, she and Guenther had relations, continued to present
themselves as husband and wife, and took vacations together. Id. at p. 37. Veronica testified
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that, when Guenther traveled with Veronica on her business trip to Korea in February 2004,
she introduced him as her husband to her family. Id. at p. 39. Upon Guenther's request,
Veronica took vacation time in October 2004 for thirty-six (36) days to take care of
Guenther when he had open heart surgery. Id. at pp. 40-41.
Veronica testified she did not intend to divorce Guenther. R0393 at p. 83. Veronica
did not file a motion with the trial court to void the Divorce Agreement. Id. Veronica
entered into the Divorce Agreement voluntarily. Id. Prior to signing the Divorce Agreement,
Veronica had prepared some divorce documents online in February 2001 which were never
filed or finalized, and the Divorce Agreement was in contemplation of that potential filing.
Id. Veronica and Guenther did not divide their financial accounts upon signing the Divorce
Agreement. Id. at p. 84. After signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther paid the taxes,
insurance, and mortgage payment on the Terra Vista Home, even while Veronica lived there
and he did not. Id. at p. 97. Veronica testified that the reason for this was because Guenther
earned more money than Veronica, and she could not afford the mortgage. Id. The Divorce
Agreement reflects that Guenther would pay the mortgage of the Terra Vista Home. Id. at
pp. 97-98.
In June, 2005, Guenther paid the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home in full. R0393 at
p. 141. Guenther testified his name was the only one on the mortgage for the Terra Vista
Home. Id. In 2002, Guenther testified that the parties filed joint tax returns and split the
return equally. Id. at p. 156. Guenther testified that, before moving to Hong Kong, Veronica
returned her copy of the Divorce Agreement to him and said it was a useless paper. Id.
Guenther testified that Veronica made a draft and they made adjustments, keeping the scope
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of the Divorce Agreement the same. Id. at p. 191. Guenther acknowledged that the Divorce
Agreement did not address personal property, such as the washer, dryer, and vehicles. Id. at
pp. 191-192.
Guenther testified that his understanding of equity took into consideration
"contributions, premarital, inheritance and so on." Id. at pp. 194-195. However, Guenther
did not discuss this with Veronica before signing the Divorce Agreement and believed there
was no need to discuss that." Id. at p. 195. Guenther testified that when he signed the
"divorce agreement," he was not contemplating a divorce. Id. at p. 198, 11. 6-10. Upon
signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther was not contemplating divorce and did not move
in that direction. Id. at p. 198. Guenther testified that there was nothing in the Divorce
Agreement that indicated the money earned by the parties after May 2001 was not separate
property. Id. at pp. 215-216. Guenther testified that, although the parties had separated their
financial accounts upon entering the Divorce Agreement, both parties had access to the
other's accounts. Id. at pp. 216-217.
In its oral findings, the trial court based its conclusion to enforce the Divorce
Agreement upon its findings that (a) Veronica testified that the Divorce Agreement was her
idea, she drafted it, and both parties appeared before a notary to sign it; (b) Veronica testified
she had no specific immediate intent to implement the Divorce Agreement, but previously
attempted to fill out paperwork for divorce; (c) Isaac required a secure place to live until he
completed High School; and, (d) while the Divorce Agreement did not address all of the
parties' financial assets, it did address a substantial number of assets and how they should be
distributed. R0394 at pp. 4-5.
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The trial court found that there was performance on the Divorce Agreement by the
parties. Id. at p. 5. Veronica's name was removed from the Terra Vista Home's mortgage,
Guenther continued to make monthly mortgage payments, and, while Veronica temporarily
moved to Hong Kong, Isaac remained in the Terra Vista Home until August of 2004. Id. at
pp. 5-6.
Hence, the trial court concluded that partial performance of the contract had been
undertaken in that both parties participated in the drafting and revision of the Divorce
Agreement and had reached a meeting of the minds. Id. at p. 6. The trial court found that the
parties accepted certain legal detriments: Guenther accepted responsibility for the mortgage,
and Veronica remained on the title of the Terra Vista Home. Id. The trial court found that
the actual filing of divorce did not take away from the enforceability of the contract. Id.
The trial court found that, since the Divorce Agreement did not provide a precise
date by which the Terra Vista Home was to be sold, it did state the sale would occur after
August 31, 2004, and that there would be equal division of equity whenever the sale
occurred. R0394 at pp. 7-8. The trial court further found that, based upon the way in which
the parties filed their tax returns after signing the Divorce Agreement, this demonstrated the
parties' intent to keep their finances separate. Id. at p. 9. The trial court found that the
distribution of the 401-K and pension plans was contemplated by the Divorce Agreement,
which indicates that they would be divided equally. Id. Furthermore, the Divorce Agreement
disclaimed Veronica's right to seek alimony. Id. While the trial court noted that, while the
Divorce Agreement did not make provisions concerning the distribution of personal
property, including stock options, this failure did not take away from the Divorce
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Agreement's enforceability, since it in large measure addressed the distribution of assets. Id.
The trial court erred in its determination that the Divorce Agreement was a valid and
binding contract between parties. The Divorce Agreement was either negotiated in bad faith
or unreasonably constrained the trial court's equitable and statutory duties. Sweet at f 3. The
parties, particularly Guenther, did not exercise good faith, honesty, and candor in negotiating
the Divorce Agreement. Neither party was actually contemplating divorce when the Divorce
Agreement was signed, which is evidenced by the record. Veronica did not see a divorce
lawyer after signing the Divorce Agreement and was unaware whether Guenther had seen a
lawyer. R0393 at p. 31. Veronica did not intend to divorce Guenther at the time she signed
the Divorce Agreement. Id. Upon signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther was not
contemplating divorce and did not move in that direction. R0393 at p. 198. In fact,
Veronica's testimony that her underlying reason for the Divorce Agreement was to simply
threaten divorce and, after doing so, Guenther treated her better. See, R0393 at p. 32. Since
the parties, upon signing the Divorce Agreement, did not intend to divorce, the parties did
not mutually assent their intent to be bound by the terms of the Divorce Agreement. Bunnell
at 600.
Furthermore, the failure of the parties to complete certain conditions precedent of
the Divorce Agreement points to the Divorce Agreement's invalidity. Asael at H40. The
Terra Vista Home was not placed for sale until after Veronica filed the Petition. See, Exhibit
"B."

Veronica detrimentally relied on one-half the equity as provided by the Divorce

Agreement pursuant to 3.1 when the Terra Vista Home was sold.
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Guenther then determined to retire the Terra Vista mortgage. His actions in failing
to pay Veronica necessarily led to implication of paragraph 3.1 in the divorce proceedings,
with a variable as to the amount of equity existing in the house and no provision for where
the money originated with which the equity resulted. Guenther was not required to pay off
the mortgage and did so of his own volition.
Additionally, Guenther did not negotiate the Divorce Agreement in good faith. Sweet
at TJ3. Guenther testified that his understanding of equity included what he considered to be
premarital money, such as contributions and his inheritance. R0393 at pp. 194-195. However,
he also testified that he did not discuss this with Veronica before signing the Divorce
Agreement. Id. at p. 195. This omission in the negotiation of the Divorce Agreement should
have compelled the trial court to decline to enforce it. Therefore, based upon the foregoing,
the trial court erred in determining the Divorce Agreement as valid and binding on the
parties.
If the Divorce Agreement is not valid, then the trial court must determine division of
marital assets based solely on the parties filing for divorce and subsequent separation, which
would require a remand for findings consistent with this opinion.
B. The Trial Court Erred by Construing the Divorce Agreement Against Veronica
The trial court made a finding that any ambiguity in the Divorce Agreement would be
construed against Veronica as the drafter. R0402. It is unclear whether this finding had any
effect as the court did not note any ambiguity in its interpretation of the contract. Making
this finding is counter to the court's statement "the Agreement drafted by Petitioner, with
modifications provided by Respondent, is an enforceable contract . . ." R0385. The Court
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also states that "because Petitioner essentially drafted the Agreement, any ambiguity should
be resolved against her . . ." R0386. This ruling is error because A) the court's findings
indicate that the document was mutually prepared, and B) this finding can only be made if a
contract demonstrates an ambiguity which no other means can resolve, and no ambiguity
was found by the court within this context
"TJf a contract is ambiguous, it will be construed against the drafter only if extrinsic
evidence fails to clarify the intent of the parties" Cherry v. Utah State University. 966 P.2d 866, 869
(Utah App 1998) (emphasis added). This Court has stated, "[i]n other words, the doctrine of
construing ambiguities in a contract against the drafter functions as a kind of tie-breaker,
used as a last resort by the fact-finder after the receipt and consideration of all pertinent
extrinsic evidence has left unresolved what the parties actually intended." Wilburn v.
Interstate Elec. 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1988).
However, the Utah Supreme Court has determined, "[u]nder Utah law, an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing generally inheres [in] all contractual relationships."
Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange. 2008 UT App 315, U36, 193 P.3d 650 citing
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 68, 1J27, 56 P.3d 524 (alteration in original)
quoting Rawson v. Conover. 2001 UT 24, ^[44, 20 P.3d 876 (internal quotations omitted).
This Court has clarified as follows:
In Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269, the Utah
Supreme Court recently clarified the proper approach to
determining the issue of contractual ambiguity. The Supreme
Court first noted that "contractual ambiguity can occur in two
different contexts: (1) facial ambiguity with regard to the
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the
intent of the contracting parties." Id. ^25. A judge must first
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determine that a contract is ambiguous on its face before it
considers the second question of ambiguity regarding intent. See
id. "[A] judge [may] ... review relevant and credible extrinsic
evidence offered to demonstrate that there is in fact an
ambiguity" on the face of the contract. Id. ^31. Once the judge
reviews this evidence, "a finding of ambiguity [is justified] only
if the competing interpretations are 'reasonably supported by
the language of the contract.' Id. (quoting Ward v. Intermountain
Farmers Assy 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995)).
Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. 2008 UT App. 405, ]f 12, 197 P.3d 659.
"Importantly, the supreme court 'did not intend that a judge allow surrounding
circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of a contract would not otherwise
permit/" Id. at ][13, citing Daines at ^[27.
The rule that language is presumptively within control of the party drafting the
agreement and that ambiguities thereby are interpreted against the drafter is frequentiy
described under the Latin term of contra proferentem, which literally means "against the offeror,
he who puts forth, or proffers or offers the language." See, 11 Williston on Contracts §32:12
(4th ed.). Because this doctrine presumes one offeror and an offeree and construes the
language against the one who had the choice of words, it has long been held that
"[c]ontracts. . .in which the parties thereto make mutual promises do not ordinarily come
within this rule." Caine v. Hagenbarth. 37 Utah 69, 106 P. 945 (Utah 1910)(emphasis added),
citing! Page on Contracts, § 1122.
In the instant case, the trial court erred by construing the Divorce Agreement against
Veronica. Exhibit "A" at p. 2. The trial court based this determination on the following
findings: Veronica downloaded certain pro se online forms to petition for divorce but said
forms were never filed. R0381. The Decree specifically states that, "Petitioner initially drafted
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the Agreement and provided it to Respondent. He, in turn, proposed certain changes. After
further negotiations Petitioner produced a final version, which the parties signed on May 14,
2001 before a notary public." Id.
The trial court erred by determining the Divorce Agreement should be construed
against Veronica in any ambiguity because, while Veronica drafted the initial version, the
contracts terms were unambiguous and the parties made adjustments to Veronica's version
and mutually promised to undertake actions thereunder. See, Tr. at p. 191. In fact, Veronica's
testimony was, "I initiated the draft, and Guenther finalized it." Tr. at p. 30. Therefore, the
trial court's determination that any ambiguity should be construed against Veronica is
erroneous due to the negotiation that took place before the Divorce Agreement was signed
and notarized. Furthermore, the intent of the parties was made clear to the trial court: neither
party intended to divorce at the time of signing the Divorce Agreement. Tr. at pp. 31 and
198. Veronica's intent to sign the Divorce Agreement reflected that, after signing the
Divorce Agreement, Guenther was nicer to her than before. Tr. at p. 32.

The Divorce

Agreement was mutually drafted and not ambiguous.
II.
EVEN IF T H E DIVORCE AGREEMENT IS VALID A N D BINDING,
T H E LANGUAGE OF T H E AGREEMENT MAKE IT ERROR TO GIVE
GUENTHER CREDIT FOR ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS MADE TO T H E
PROPERTY FROM WHATEVER SOURCE.
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Offsetting the Proceeds

The Divorce Agreement provided at its core that Veronica's name was to be taken off
the loans for the Terra Vista property, but that her name would remain on the title. Then at
some point in the future (after August 31, 2004), the property would be sold and Veronica
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would receive the equity "divided equally," or in any event no less than $70,000.00. (Exhibit
B, Trial Exhibit P-4). Under this contract, any payments made by Guenther to the loans on
the property prior to its sale involving making payments to Veronica without regard to
offset.

Any other interpretation renders the Veronica's benefits under the contract

illusory—she bargained for a situation where she would have no responsibility for any debt
payments on the property, but she would still have full ownership in the property.
What does she gain by keeping her name on the property, if payments made to the
property are not treated as a gift to the marriage? What rationale can Guenther present for
making additional payments on a house owned jointly by he and his wife, (to which she has a
contract stating that she has no responsibility for the debt payments), with the Equity to be
"divided equally upon property sale closure," and then claiming that he was not making a gift
payments to a marital property? 3.1 says "Equity will be divided equally . . ." (Exhibit B,
emphasis added). She waived her right to alimony under the Divorce Agreement—for what?
For an equal share of any equity which accrued in the Terra Vista property, including an
equal share of any payments Guenther made to the Terra Vista property. She is entitled to
the benefit of her bargain.
This Court has held, "[i]t is [a] court's duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as
expressed in the plain language of the covenants."

Holladay Duplex Management Co..

L.L.C. v. Howells. 2002 UT App 125, 117, 47 P.3d 104, citing Swenson v. Erickson. 2000 UT
16, U l l , 998 P.2d 807. Furthermore, [s]uch language is to be taken in its ordinary and
generally understood and popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical refinement
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nor the words torn from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon."
Id., citing Freeman v. Gee. 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155,163 (1967).
This Court has found, "[i]f the language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, then a court does not resort to extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning,
and a court determines the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual
language as a matter of law." Young v. Wardley Corp.. 2008 UT App. 104,1J9, 182 P.3d citing
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc.. 2002 UT 62, fL6, 52 P.3d 1179. The parties'
intentions are controlling. State v. Ison. 2006 UT 26, 1J46, 135 P.3d 864 citing Bakowski at
TJ16. Thus, "[t]he trial court is to consider "[e]ach contract provision ... in relation to all of
the others, with a view to giving effect to all and ignoring none.'" Young at ^[10 citing Plateau
Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990).
This Court has previously determined, "[t]he rule is well settled that a person cannot
recover back money which he has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all of the facts,
without fraud, duress, or extortion in some form." Southern Title Guar. Co.. Inc. v. Bethers.
761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App 1988), citing 66 Amjur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 93
(1973). The Utah Supreme Court has found as follows:
We have previously held that a trial court must consider many
factors in making a property settlement in a divorce proceeding,
but that the purpose of the settlement should not be to impose
punishment on either party. Although the court ruled that
"marital misconduct . . . should be considered in making an
equitable division of property," it does not necessarily follow
that the defendant was in fact in any way punished by the
ultimate division made of the property.
Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah, 1980) citing Read v. Read, 594
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P.2d 871 (1979).
Therefore, "[i]n making a property division, a court may properly consider such things as the
length of the marriage and parties' respective contributions to the marriage." Id. citing English
v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (1977).
In the instant case, the trial court determined the Divorce Agreement was valid and
binding upon the parties. Should this Court determine likewise, the trial court erred in
offsetting the Proceeds resulting from the sale of the Terra Vista Home. Guenther testified
that, between 2003 and June of 2005, he paid the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home in full.
Tr. at p. 141. The trial court determined Guenther used money from his inheritance,
bonuses, and incentives pay to retire the mortgage. R0337.
The Divorce Agreement indicates the Terra Vista Home was required to be placed on
the market and the sale was to take place after August 31, 2004. See, Exhibit "B". The equity
was divided in one (1) of two (2) ways: "3.1 In the case of sale of the property: Equity will be
divided equally upon property sale closure. 3.2 In the case of pay-out on September 1, 2004:
Equity will be calculated based on property sale listing price (minus closing cost) at that time
or $70K, whichever the greater amount will be paid out to Veronica by Guenther." Exhibit
"B".
Instead of opting to payout Veronica on September 1, 2004, Guenther instead made
additional principal payments from 2003 to June 2005 to completely retire the mortgage. The
trial court proceeded to enforce the Divorce Agreement and divided the Proceeds in
accordance to 3.1 but offset the Proceeds in the process. The Trial Court did not divide the
equity "equally upon property sale closure." The trial court neglected to consider Veronica's
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contribution to the improvement, operation, preservation, and care of the property when she
lived there in 2005-2006, after Guenther paid off the mortgage, another issue the Divorce
Agreement does not contemplate. The trial court further erred by also neglecting to consider
that Veronica's name was on the Terra Vista tide. Veronica reasonably believed that she was
getting half of all equity and contracted her right to alimony against this sum. See Mortensen
at 307. Therefore, considering the factors the trial court did not undertake concerning the
offset, the trial court erred and prejudiced Veronica.
Isaac who was seventeen (17) remained with Guenther in the Terra Vista Home while
Veronica resided in Hong Kong, so as to finish high school. Id. The paperwork concerning
Veronica's apartment in Hong Kong reflected she rented the unit from March 24, 2003,
through August 1, 2005. Tr. at p. 24. Guenther visited Veronica in Hong Kong, staying with
Veronica in the apartment. Tr. at p. 25. Veronica considered them to be husband and wife in
the apartment. Id. Veronica also visited the states while residing in Hong Kong. Id. Veronica
also provided the trial court with email correspondence exchanged between the parties while
she was in Hong Kong. Tr. at p. 26. Veronica worked for the Asia division for two (2) years
and seven (7) months. Tr. at p. 26. Veronica visited the states six (6) times during that time.
Tr. at p. 27. Veronica decided to come back to Utah because she was lonely and wanted to
be close to family. Tr. at pp. 27-28. Guenther expressed his concern that she would not have
a job if she returned. Tr. at p. 28.
Veronica testified that Guenther removed her name from the first mortgage, which is
in accordance to the Divorce Agreement. Tr. at pp. 32-33. Veronica testified that Guenther
moved back into the Terra Vista Home when she moved to Hong Kong in January of 2003.
28

Tr. at p. 34. Prior to moving to Hong Kong and Guenther moving back into the home,
Veronica paid the utility bills and maintenance concerning the Terry Vista Home. Id.
Veronica and Guenther shared the costs of any damage to the Terra Vista Home. Tr. at pp.
34-35. Terra Vista was not put up for sale in 2004. Tr. at p. 35. The Terra Vista Home was
put up for sale in November 2005, a month after Veronica filed for divorce. Id. Veronica
testified that, since she had come back to the Terra Vista House without a job, Guenther
told her to buy her own groceries and that he would not support her. Tr. at p. 42. The Terra
Vista Home was sold on August 17, 2006, pursuant to an agreement between Veronica and
Guenther. Tr. at p. 50. When the Terra Vista Home was placed for sale, both parties were
living there. Id.
After signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther paid the taxes, insurance, and
mortgage payment on the Terra Vista Home, even while Veronica lived there because she
could not afford the mortgage. Tr. at p. 97. The Divorce Agreement reflects that Guenther
would pay the mortgage of the Terra Vista Home. Tr. at pp. 97-98. Guenther testified that,
in June, 2005, he paid in full the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. Tr. at p. 141.
Accordingly as the trial court failed to take into consideration Veronica's improvement,
operation, preservation, and care of the property while she resided there, the fact her name
was on the title, and the fact that the Divorce Agreement did not contemplate Guenther's
retiring of the mortgage, the trial court erred in offsetting the proceeds of the Terra Vista
home.
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B.

The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Guenther the Inheritance Monies he
had Paid into the Terra Vista Home

This Court has found, "[gjenerally, in a divorce proceeding "[e]ach party is presumed
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property."
Bradford v. Bradford. 1999 UT App. 373,1J22, 993 P.2d 887 citing Thomas v. Thomas. 375
Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25, 987 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah Ct.App.1999). Yet, "[t]his presumptive rule
of thumb, however, does not supersede the trial court's broad equitable power to distribute
marital property, regardless of who holds title." Id. (citations omitted). Hence, "[a]n unequal
division of marital property, however, is only justified when the trial court "memorialize[s] in
commendably detailed findings" the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution."
Id. at ^|27 (citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has determined as follows concerning inheritance and divorce:
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making "equitable"
property division pursuant to [UT. CODE ANN. §] 30-3-5 should,
in accordance with the rule prevailing in most other jurisdictions
and with the division made in many of our own cases, generally
award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance
during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof)
to that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement
of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts
or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable
interest in it, Dubois v. Dubois, supra, or (2) the property has been
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges
or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest
therein to the other spouse. Cf. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326
(Utah 1980).
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) (alteration to
original).
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Thus, "[t]he remaining property should be divided equitably between the parties as in other
divorce cases, but not necessarily with strict mathematical equality." Id.
This Court has held, "Utah law provides that a spouse may transfer his or her interest
in separately acquired property into the marital estate." Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App.
373, 1J22, 993 P.2d 887 citing UT. CODE ANN. §30-2-3. Bradford continues, "[a] transfer of
otherwise separate property to a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is generally
presumed to be a gift, see 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 103(a), at 397 (1991) {citing Kramer v.
Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157,159 (Mo.Ct.App. 1986)), and, when coupled with an evident intent to
do so, effectively changes the nature of that property to marital property." Id., citing
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307-08 (Utah 1988). Mortensen continues:
The rule that property acquired by gift or inheritance by one
spouse should be awarded to that spouse on divorce unless the
other spouse has, by his or her efforts with regard to the
property, acquired an equity in it does not apply when the
property thus acquired is consumed, such as when a gift or an
inheritance of money is used for family purposes, In re Marriage
of Metcalf 183 Mont. 266, 598 P.2d 1140 (1979); when the
property completely loses its identity and is not traceable
because it is commingled with other property (sometimes called
transmuted), Wurman v. Wierman, [130 Wis.2d 425, 387 N.W.2d
744 (Wis.,1986)]; Klingberg v. K/ingberg, [68 Ill.App.3d 513, 386
N.E.2d 517 (IlLApp. 1 Dist, 1979)]; Agent v. Agent, 604 P.2d 862
(Okla.Ct.App. 1979); or when the acquiring spouse places tide in
their joint names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to
make it marital property. Hussey v. Hussey, [280 S.C. 418, 312
S.E.2d267 (S.CApp,1984)]."
Mortensen at 307.
This Court has stated that, when a spouse fails to meet the requirement for finding "that the
other spouse's separate property has become part of the marital estate, an interest in a
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spouse's separate property nonetheless may be awarded to the other spouse under an
equitable division of property and in lieu of alimony, or in other extraordinary situations
where equity so demands." Child v. Child. 2008 U T App 338,11100,194 P.3d 205.
In the instant case, the trial court awarded Guenther $241,465.52 from the Proceeds
before attempting to equitably distribute the Proceeds between the parties. Exhibit " A " at p.
3. The Court states, "Respondent will receive the first $241,465.52 from the proceeds,
representing the extra payments made by Respondent to retire the mortgage on the residence
after the parties separated their finances in May 2001, and one-half of the cost of repairs to
the Residence, prior to the division of the sales proceeds." Id. The trial court found, "[a]fter
the parties separated their financial accounts in May 2001, Respondent made extra payments
on the Residence. Those payments were made from moneys received by Respondent as
bonuses, incentive pay, a n d / o r

an inheritance. Through those payments

(made by

Respondent between June 2003 and June 2005), Respondent was able to retire the mortgage
on the Residence (approximately $230,000)." R0377. Hence, "[h]e should be credited with
the full value of those extra payments before equity in the Residence is allocated to the
parties." Id. Guenther's Inheritance totaled approximately $45,000.
The trial court erred by awarding the Inheritance used by Guenther to retire the
mortgage back to Guenther. While parties are entitled to all of his/her separate property and
fifty percent of the marital property in a divorce proceeding, the Inheritance became marital
property when Guenther paid it into the Terra Vista mortgage. Bradford at ^[22. The trial
court erred in its determination. Id.
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The findings concerning the Gingerwood Home state, "[f|or her part Petitioner
argues that once Respondent placed her name on the title to the Kearns house he effectively
"gifted" her with one-half interest in the property. Moreover, Veronica argues that since the
money from the sale of the Kearns house was used to purchase their new Residence, those
funds have been so co-mingled as to lose any separate status as a premarital asset." R0370.
Hence the trial court concluded as follows:
When Respondent placed Petitioner's name on the title to the
Kearns house, he effectively gifted Petitioner with one-half the
value of that home, irrespective of the fact that he had paid for
it in full before the marriage. No evidence was presented
identifying exactly when Respondent took this action, or the
reasons for why he did so. No evidence was presented to
suggest that Petitioner's name on the tide to the Kearns house
was a necessary prerequisite for securing the mortgage to
purchase another building lot. After the mortgage on the Kearns
house was secured, the evidence indicates that the parties paid
that obligation with funds from the joint account into which
both of their salaries were deposited. When the Kearns house
was sold the proceeds were used by the parties to build their
new marital Residence. The court concludes that through gifting
and co-mingling of funds used to pay the mortgage, the Kearns
house lost its character as Respondent's premarital property.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the proceeds realized from
the sale of the Kearns house became a marital asset which was
subsequently reinvested in the Residence — another marital
asset.
R0385.
Concerning the Inheritance, the trial court concluded that, even though Veronica
claimed signing authority on the "joint account" into which Guenther deposited the
Inheritance, the Inheritance was Guenther's sole and separate property. R0390. Thus, the
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trial court determined he should receive full credit for using the Inheritance towards
payments the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. Id.
The trial court neglected to realize the Inheritance became co-mingled and marital
property by its being paid into the mortgage. Guenther used the Inheritance to contribute to
the enhancement and maintenance of the Terra Vista Home and, by paying the Inheritance
into the mortgage, the Inheritance lost its identity because it was "gifted" to Veronica in the
same way as the Kearns property. See, Mortensen at 308. Guenther testified that as of June,
2005, he paid in full the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. R393 -Tr. at p. 141.
Guenther essentially transferred his interest in the Inheritance into the Terra Vista
Home, the marital estate. Bradford at ^[22. This "transfer" was separate property until
Guenther paid the Inheritance into the Terra Vista Home, wherein the resulting equity was
to be divided equally between the parties. Id. Hence, the Inheritance became marital
property. Id. Veronica obtained an interest in the Inheritance when it was paid into the
mortgage because the equity resulting therefrom was to be divided equally between the
parties. Id. at 307. The Terra Vista Home was clearly marital property (Veronica was still on
the title at the time of the sale of the Terra Vista Home) and Guenther's intent to keep the
Inheritance separate is moot when the Inheritance was co-mingled with equity resulting from
the sale of the Terra Vista Home. Id. Furthermore, the Divorce Agreement was intended to
award Veronica a substantial sum so as to negate the need for alimony. Veronica was found
to have given up claim for alimony pursuant to the Divorce Agreement; however, she
detrimentally relied upon the Proceeds to obviate the need for alimony. Therefore, as the
Divorce Agreement expressly provides for the Proceeds to be equally divided, the trial court
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erred by awarding Guenther back the Inheritance, particularly when the Inheritance was
gifted to Veronica and co-mingled among funds that were intended to be divided equally
between the parties.
III.

T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING GUENTHER EQUITY IN
T H E TERRA VISTA HOME MADE PURSUANT TO T H E DIVORCE
AGREEMENT FOLLOWING ITS SIGNING UP TO A N D INCLUDING
T H E SALE OF SAID PROPERTY; IN AWARDING HIM INTEREST O N
T H E PROCEEDS HELD IN ESCROW OF T H E TERRA VISTA
PROPERTY; and I N E N T E R I N G CONFLICTING
FINDINGS
REGARDING T H E SEPARATION OF THEIR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Guenther the Equity Up to and
Including the Sale of the Terra Vista Home

"In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . ." UT. R. ClV. P. 52(a). The
findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is
supported by, die evidence.'" Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, 1124, 18 P.3d 1129, citing
Butler. Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.. 909 P.2d 225, 231
(Utah 1995)(citations omitted).
This Court has determined, "[a] trial court's findings should fit 'within the framework
of the petition as originally drawn, or as amended' and should be supported by the evidence
presented." Lee v. Sanders. 2002 UT App. 281, f7, 55 P.3d 1127 citing In re Behm's Estate.
117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657, 663 (1950). The Utah Supreme Court has found as follows:
In regard to the matter of the sufficiency of findings of fact, a
substantial compliance with Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, is sufficient, and findings of fact and conclusions of
law will support a judgment, though they are very general, where
they in most respects follow the allegation of the pleadings.
Findings should be limited to the ultimate facts and if they
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ascertain ultimate facts, and sufficiently conform to the
pleadings and the evidence to support the judgment, they will be
regarded as sufficient, though not as full and as complete as
might be desired.
Pearson v. Pearson. 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977) (footnotes
omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has long held, "[t]he trial court, in an equity, as well as in a
law, case, should itself assume the labor of making specific findings of fact which respond to
and dispose of the material issues; and in an equity case, where that has not been done, we
may reverse and remand[.]" Munsee v. McKellar. 39 Utah 282, 116 P. 1024, 1027 (Utah
1911).
"Generally, in a divorce proceeding '[ejach party is presumed to be entitled to all of
his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.'" Bradford v. Bradford.
1999 UT App. 373, ]|26, 993 P.2d 887 citing Thomas v. Thomas. 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25,
987 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah Ct.App.1999). Hence, "[ajn unequal division of marital property,
however, is only justified when the trial court 'memorialize[s] in commendably detailed
findings' the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Id. at \ 27. "[Although
the trial court could make an award of marital property that was weighted in favor of the
spouse that did not also have separate property, such a division should be based on an
'equitable rationale' set forth in the findings of fact and conclusions of law." Stonehocker v.
Stonehocker. 2008 UT App 11, H21,176 P.3d 476.
In the instant case, the trial court determined the Divorce Agreement was a valid and
binding contract. The trial court awarded Guenther equity in the Terra Vista Home made
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pursuant to the Divorce Agreement following its signing up to and including the sale of the
Terra Vista Home. The Judgment awards $241,465.52 to Guenther, which includes the extra
payments made to retire the mortgage and one-half the cost to repair the Terra Vista Home
for its sale, after the separation of the parties' financial accounts in May 2001. Exhibit "A" at
p. 3. Veronica raises the issue of the Inheritance being awarded back to Guenther herein and
further raises issue with Guenther being awarded back monthly mortgage payments
following the signing of the Divorce Agreement up to and including the sale of the Terra
Vista Home, particularly when the Divorce Agreement plainly states, "Guenther will be
responsible for the mortgage and equity loan payments on the Terra Vista property through
the end of August 2004." Exhibit "B".

The trial court's award of monthly mortgage

payments to Guenther direcdy contradicts its determination that the Divorce Agreement is
enforceable, notably since the Divorce Agreement does not provide for such an award. See,
Exhibit "B".
The trial court found, "Respondent assumed full responsibility for the mortgage and
Petitioner's name was removed from that obligation. Respondent continued to pay the
mortgage on the Residence from the time the parties entered into the Agreement until the
mortgage on the Residence was paid off by Respondent in June 2005. Nevertheless,
Petitioner's name remained on the tide to the Residence until it was sold on or about the
Summer, 2006." R0383.
The Terra Vista Home was sold on August 17, 2006, pursuant to an agreement
between Veronica and Guenther. Tr. at p. 50. When the Terra Vista Home was placed for
sale, both parties were living there. Id.
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Veronica is presumed to be entitled to fifty percent of the marital property without
the Divorce Agreement in place. Bradford at 1126. However, the Divorce Agreement
provides she is entided to half the equity in the Proceeds and Guenther was to pay the
monthly mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. The trial court determined the Divorce
Agreement to be enforceable and then entered an unequal division of the Proceeds without
sufficient findings in support thereof. Id. at H27. Furthermore, the F O F / C O L do not set
forth an equitable rationale to support such a Judgment on this issue.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Guenther the Interest Accrued on
the Proceeds of the Terra Vista Home while in Escrow.

In addition, the trial court awarded Guenther all of the interest accrued on the
Proceeds throughout the pendency of the action. Exhibit "A" at p. 3. The trial court states,
"[f)urther the party claiming the interest on the escrow account shall be awarded any interest
which accrued on the escrowed sales proceeds." Id. At trial, Guenther did not calculate
interest accumulating on the Proceeds since it had been placed in escrow but acknowledged
Veronica was entitled to her portion of it. Tr. at p. 147. The trial court's FOF/COL do not
set forth findings or conclusions concerning the interest accruing on the Proceeds. Little
evidence was introduced at trial concerning it, except for Guenther's testimony that, while he
had not calculated the interest, Veronica was entitled to her portion of it. Tr. at p. 147.
However, the Judgment awards all of the interest to the party claiming it, which was
Guenther. Exhibit "A" at p. 3. This award of the interest evidences the trial court was not
acting according to its equitable duties.
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The FOF/COL do not set forth an equitable rationale concerning the interest on the
Proceeds. Stonehocker at 1121. The FOF/COL do not comply with the standard set forth by
UT. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The Judgment awards the interest to Guenther without support in the
FOF/COL, as this award does not follow logically from and is not supported by the
evidence, particularly when Guenther testified Veronica was entided to her portion of the
interest. Bailey at 1124; see, Tr. at p. 147. The Judgment simply states, "[fjurther the party
claiming the interest on the escrow account shall be awarded any interest which accrued on
the escrowed sales proceeds." Exhibit "A" at p. 3. Thus, since the Judgment does not rest
upon adequate findings and conclusions concerning this issue, the FOF/COL in this case are
insufficient and warrant remand for further findings thereon. Pearson at 1082 and Munsee at
1027.
Furthermore, as the Proceeds were marital property, Veronica is presumed to be
entided to fifty percent of the proceeds, which was set forth by the Divorce Agreement.
Bradford at 1J26. Interest was not contemplated by the Divorce Agreement; however, as the
interest would be included in the Proceeds, Veronica was entided to half the Proceeds, which
would include interest thereon. However, since Veronica was not awarded accordingly, the
trial court was required to memoralize in detailed findings the exceptional circumstances
supporting such a distribution to Guenther. Id. at 1f27. Such findings are not found in this
case with regards to this issue. Furthermore, the equitable rationale which are presumed to
be found within the findings are also absent in this case. Stonehocker at 1J21. Therefore,
remand is appropriate for further findings on this issue which are supported by the evidence
given at Trial.
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C.

The Trial Court Entered Conflicting Findings
Separation of the Parties5 Financial Accounts

Concerning

the

Veronica clearly testified that the financial accounts were not "divided" in May 2001,
but that they were "separated," so they each had their own accounts. R0393 - tr. p. 84,11. 13, 15-17. Aside from her testimony, Veronica submitted the actual bank account statements
in her post-trial motions to demonstrate that the money in the accounts was never divided,
but just that each party began using one account as a primary account.

R0412-16; 0426-44.

She also submitted this evidence in an objection to Proposed Findings of Fact prior to the
court's entry of the same. R305-306. No allocation of the parties' funds never actually
occurred in 2001.
The trial court determined the parties separated their financial accounts as of May 25,
2001. Exhibit "A" at p. 2. In its findings, the trial court found the following:
The parties initially separated on or about May 2001. Between
May 2001 and March 2006 the parties spent extended periods of
time in separate households, but have also spent some together.
For example, Petitioner relocated to Hong Kong in January
2003, but her son remained at the house with Respondent
pursuant to the terms of a "Divorce Agreement" the parties
negotiated in February 2001. Moreover, during the Petitioner's
time in Hong Kong the parties continued to put themselves
forward as husband wife, they traveled and vacationed together,
visited each other periodically, and Petitioner returned to Utah
to care for Respondent when he underwent surgery; she
remained here for a substantial period of time providing for his
care. After Petitioner returned to the United States from Hong
Kong she lived at the Residence until it was sold in August,
2006. It is not clear from the evidence at trial exactly when
Respondent left the Residence permanently after Petitioner
returned from Hong Kong.
R0371-0372.
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However, this finding conflicts with the evidence produced at trial.
Veronica received approximately $6,000 from the sale of her home in Alabama.
R0393 - Tr. at p. 10. Veronica placed the funds in a joint account she had begun to share
with Guenther. Tr. at p. 11. Veronica and Guenther had joint checking and savings
accounts, which Guenther controlled. Tr. at p. 20.
Veronica testified that, after Guenther moved out in April 2001, she saw him at the
Terra Vista Home once ever weekend or more. Tr. at p. 36. Guenther visited Veronica in
Hong Kong, staying with Veronica in the apartment. Tr. at p. 25. Veronica considered them
to be husband and wife in the apartment. Id. Veronica also visited the states while residing in
Hong Kong. Id. Veronica also provided the trial court with email correspondence exchanged
between the parties while she was in Hong Kong. Tr. at p. 26. Veronica visited the states six
(6) times while living in Hong Kong. Tr. at p. 27. Veronica decided to come back to Utah
because she was lonely and wanted to be close to family. Tr. at pp. 27-28. Veronica testified
that, although they were separated, she and Guenther had relations; whenever they went out
they presented themselves as husband and wife, and took vacations together. Tr. at p. 37.
Veronica testified that, when Guenther traveled with Veronica on her business trip to Korea
in February 2004, she introduced him as her husband to her family. Tr. at p. 39. Veronica
took vacation time in October 2004 to assist Guenther when he had open heart surgery. Tr.
at pp. 40-41.
Veronica ceased depositing her paychecks into the joint accounts on May 25, 2001. Id.
However, both parties had access to the other's accounts. Id. Guenther would withdraw
from Veronica's account and reimburse her for it. Tr. at pp. 84-85. Veronica was not placing
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money into the joint account after moving to Hong Kong although her name remained on
the accounts. Tr. at p. 86. Veronica acknowledged she did not deposit money into the joint
accounts before withdrawing $29,000 and did not seek permission from Guenther before
doing so. Tr. at pp. 86-87. Veronica testified her reason for withdrawing from the $29,000
was to pay debts. Tr. at p. 87. Veronica testified it would be appropriate for Guenther to
withdraw a similar sum from her bank account because the parties' names were on their
bank accounts, joint and individual. Id. Veronica considered the money she earned after May
25, 2001 to be marital money. Tr. at pp. 88-89. While Veronica was living in Hong Kong,
Guenther would withdraw money from her individual account to pay for expenses incurred
by Isaac. Tr. at p. 93. Guenther had no access to Veronica's account in Hong Kong. Tr. at p.
101.
In April 2001, Guenther testified that the parties split their marital monies 50% to
each party by transferring funds from accounts. Tr. at pp. 139-140. Guenther testified that,
after this time, Veronica's last paycheck deposited to the joint account was then transferred
to her individual checking account. Tr. at p. 140. After signing the Divorce Agreement,
Veronica took care of her obligations. Id. Guenther testified he gave Veronica notice when
he was transferring monies from her account to his. Tr. at pp. 140-141. Guenther testified
that, although the parties had separated their financial accounts upon entering the Divorce
Agreement, both parties had access to the other's accounts. Tr. at pp. 216-217. Guenther
testified he believed their personal property was split by splitting bank accounts on April 14,
2001. Id. No documentation was presented that indicated the parties had separated their
accounts in May 2001.
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Veronica filed post-judgment motions requesting the Judgment be altered. Veronica
pointed out therein that the trial court did not indicate how the interest would be divided on
the Proceeds in its F O F / C O L . R0478. In response to Veronica's post-judgment motions,
Guenther requested the interest be awarded solely to him, which it had been in the
Judgment. Id. Guenther produced an email from Veronica to him, which indicated he was to
have the interest on the Proceeds; however, this document was not produced until after
Trial. R0511.
The F O F / C O L does not show that the Judgment follows logically from and is
supported by the evidence concerning the division of the parties' financial accounts. Bailey at
1124. Both parties retained signing rights on the other's accounts. Furthermore, this issue was
disagreed upon at Trial and neither party could produce evidence that such division actually
took place on May 25, 2001. Therefore, as the Judgment does not follow logically from and
is not supported by the evidence, the F O F / C O L are insufficient on this issue. Id.
Furthermore, the parties' disagreement at trial concerning the date of financial separation
without evidence to support their individual contention is not sufficient evidence to support
findings and consequendy a Judgment the date of financial separation occurred on May 25,
2001. Lee at ]f7. Since the evidence does not support the F O F / C O L , the trial court's specific
findings thereon cannot dispose of material issues. Munsee at 1027. Therefore, remand is
also appropriate on this issue to determine the evidence to support its findings. The trial
court made an unequal division of marital property and relied on its erroneous date to
determine the division of financial accounts. Braford at f26. Furthermore, the detailed
F O F / C O L on this issue relied on erroneous evidence which cannot support exceptional
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circumstances to support the unequal division of property. Id. at f 27.
IV. T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED I N USING T H E N E W VALUES (INSTEAD
OF DEPRECIATED VALUES) FOR MAJOR HOUSEHOLD ITEMS and T H E
2002 VW GOLF I N ORDERING VERONICA TO PAY GUENTHER O N E HALF
T H E VALUE OF THOSE ITEMS.
A.

Major Household Items.

Guenther at trial testified that he considered the current value of the washer and
Dryer to be $824, (half of purchase price); the TV $1,010, (half of purchase price); and the
current value of the Dining Set $3,450.00, 75% of purchase price, based on his experience
with depreciation. (Tr. PI59-161). These values and Guenther's estimates were stated in
Respondent's Exhibits 1C, IK, 2W, 3B, and 31 (all duplicates), and total $5,284.00, of which
Veronica should pay half, or $2,642.00. Guenther also included the original receipts for the
washer/dryer, TV, and Dining set as exhibit I K and 31 (attached), which showed original
purchase prices of the washer and dryer for $1,648.32 on 4/19/00, Sony TV receipt for
$2,020.54 on 4/24/00, and the Dining Set for $4,599.64 on 4/24/00.
The trial court rejected the current values (for January 2007) testified to and
submitted by Guenther, and instead chose to simply use the year 2000 purchase price of a
nearly 7-year-old TV, washer/dryer, and dining room set, with a total of $8,268.50, ordering
that Veronica should pay half, or $4,134.25. R377-78; R403; R407. This was an abuse of
discretion; the Decree should be direcdy modified to reflect the only current value testified
to for these items ($5,284.00), with Veronica being ordered to pay $2,642.00 for her share.
B.

The 2002 VW Golf

The Trial Court found that "as to the value of the 2002 VW Golf, the only evidence
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presented to the Court was the value listed by [Veronica] in her 2005 financial declaration.
At trial [Guenther] also adopted the value reported by Petitioner as an appropriate measure
of the vehicle's value." R378. This 2005 Value was $10,275.00, of which Veronica was
ordered to pay half, or $5,137.50. R. 404, 407.
The only trial testimony concerning the value of the 2002 Golf was the following
statement by Guenther:
Then the Golf 2002 which is a little bit - it's not - I took 50%
of the estimates submitted by the petitioner. The petitioner
claimed for and got the right to use the Golf since hr return in
August 2005 from Hong Kong. Then I think it's fair to use the
value we have closest to this date, and not of today.
R0393-tr.R160,ll. 5-10.
The court's statement concerning the only submitted value of the 2002 Golf being
Veronica's 2005 Financial Declaration is simply a case of Guenther substituting his judgment
for the Court's in a proposed order which the court adopted.

Veronica

submitted an

updated sworn Financial Declaration for Pretrial dated September 29, 2006, which listed the
current value of the Golf as $6,588, which was marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 26. While 26
was apparently not admitted as evidence, Petitioner's Exhibit 13 (attached) was admitted as
evidence, which also listed the current value of the Golf as $6,588.00. Guenther included a
note in his Exhibits IK and 31 that he believed the $10,250.00 value from Veronica's 2005
Financial Declaration should be used. Interestingly Guenther also admitted his own sworn
Financial Declaration as evidence, dated September 22, 2006, in which Guenther swore
under oath that the value of the 2002 Golf was $8,950.00. (Respondent's Exhibit 8, attached)
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Since the Trial Court's findings indicated that it had no evidence of the Golfs value
other than Veronica's 2005 Financial Declaration (which was not admitted), the trial court
clearly disregarded the evidence presented by Guenther that he valued the Golf at $8950, and
Veronica's evidence that she valued it at $6588.00. Again it would be an abuse of discretion
to use a two-year-old value not submitted as evidence, instead of using either of two values
submitted within four months of the trial date. This issue should be* remanded to the trial
court to enter a value of the 2002 Golf conforming to the evidence actually submitted by the
parties as to its current value.
V. ATTORNEY FEES O N APPEAL
"A party seeking to recover attorney fees incurred on appeal shall state the request
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award." Strauss v. Tuschman. 2009 UT
App 215, 1J12, 216 P.3d 370; UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9). Veronica was awarded partial
attorney fees by the trial court pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-3(1), based upon the fact that
Guenther was in a better position financially to assist with her attorney's fees, and that she
was partially successful in her claims. R0278. "Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were
awarded below to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that
party on appeal."

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Veronica

accordingly requests an order for costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal,
pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-3(1), as the prevailing party on this appeal. In addition, the trial
court should reassess the amount of its fee award in light of additional areas of success as a
result of this appeal.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court
reverse the trial court in this matter, remand for further findings consistent with this opinion,
enter orders for property division where the evidence is uncontroverted, and award attorney
fees and costs on appeal.

DATED this XL. day of Ai~T2009.
David S. Pace
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy, postage pre-paid, of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant on this

\ /

day of

. 2009 to the

following:
Mr. Terry R. Spencer
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
140 West 9000 South, Suite 9
Sandy Utah 84070
David S. Pace
Attorney for Appellant
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DATE.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

VERONICA LEE JACOBSEN,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
-vs-

Case No. 054905684

GUENTHER JACOBSEN,

Judge: Lindberg

Respondent.

Commissioner Casey

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came before the Court on the 31st day of January
2007, for trial, before the Honorable Denise Lindberg, District Court Judge, and the Court having
heard the testimony of the parties, and having received into evidence documents from both parties,
and having heard the proffers of counsel and based thereon, and having reviewed the written
arguments of both parties and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and based thereon and for good cause appearing therefore;

Decree of Divorce (

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
1.

The parties are hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce, on the grounds of irreconcilable

differences, dissolving the bonds of matrimony previously existing between the parties, the same to
become final upon signing by the court and entry by the clerk.
2.

Petitioner's clam to Respondent's inheritance is categorically rej ected and Petitioner

shall have no claim to Respondent's inherited monies, including those monies used to retire the
mortgage on the former marital residence (the "Residence.")
3.

The Divorce Agreement is hereby deemed to be a valid and enforceable contract and

any ambiguity shall be resolved against Petitioner, as the drafter. Petitioner has waived any claim
to alimony, now or in the future, and no alimony shall be awarded to Petitioner.
4.

May 25,2001, shall be the date used for the purpose of separating the joint financial

accounts previously held by the parties. Respondent is hereby awarded the $29,777.29 wrongfully
removed from Respondent's account. This sum shall be drawn from Petitioner's share of the sales
proceeds from the Residence.
5.

January 31,2007 shall be used as the date of valuation for Respondent' s stock options

accumulated during the marriage and each party shall receive one-half of the value of the stock
options as of that date.
6.

January 31,2007 shall be used as the date of valuation for the parties' pensions plans,

401(k) plans and/or other retirements. Petitioner shall be awarded one-half of the $68,829.64
withdrawn from Respondent's 401 (k) plan and Respondent shall receive one-half of the $12,000.00
cashed out of Petitioner's retirement. Petitioner shall receive an offset of $28,414.82 from the

monies she is ordered to pay Respondent from her share of the sales proceeds of the Residence.
7.

The balances of the parties' defined contribution retirement accounts, and

Respondent's defined benefit account shall be divided equally pursuant to property prepared
QDROs.
8.

The date of sale (August 2006) shall be used for the date of division of equity in the

Residence. The sales proceeds were placed in escrow and shall be paid to the parties upon
presentation of a signed copy of this Decree of Divorce as follows:
a.

Respondentwillreceivethefirst$241,465.52 from the proceeds, representing

the extra payments made by Respondent to retire the mortgage on the residence after the parties
separated their finances in May 2001, and one-half of the cost of repairs to the Residence, prior to
the division of the sales proceeds. Further, the party claiming the interest on the escrow account
shall be awarded any interest which accrued on the escrowed sales proceeds.
b.

The remaining sales proceeds ($247,483.59) shall be divided between the

parties, equally, and, prior to the distribution of those funds, the following amounts shall be
transferred to the respective party's balance as follows:
i.

Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $29,777.29, from her one-

half of the sales proceeds, representing the monies Petitioner wrongfully removed from a joint
account used solely by Respondent;
ii.

Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $4,134.25, from her one-

half of the sales proceeds, representing Respondent's one-half interest in the maj or personal property
retained by Petitioner;

iv.

Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $5,137.5,fromher one-half

of the sales proceeds, representing Respondent's one-half interest in the value of the VW Golf
vehicle (as reported by Petitioner in her December 2005 financial declaration);
v.

Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $2,117.50, as set forth on

the affidavit of fees filed by Respondent's counsel, representing the attorney's fees incurred by
Respondent in bringing to the court's attention Petitioner's wrongful removal of monies from
Respondent's account.
vi.

Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $ 14,417.21, from her one-

half share of the sales proceeds, representing Petitioner's pre-marital debt paid by Respondent as set
forth in footnote 2 of the Court's Findings of Fact;
vii.

Respondent shall pay Petitioner the sum of $47,256.35, from his one-

half share of the sales proceeds, representing Petitioner's one-half interest in the parties' retirement
accounts and stock options; and
viii.

Respondent shall pay Petitioner the sum of $2,500.00, from his one-

half share of the sales proceeds, representing a contribution to Petitioner's attorney's fees.
c.

The escrow agent is hereby ordered to disburse the escrowed sales proceeds by

issuing a check to Petitioner in the amount of $ 117,914.3 8 and a check to Respondent in the amount
of $371,034.72, plus any interest remaining in the account as of the date of disbursement, as more
specifically set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto.
9.

Each party shall be awarded any and all other assets or debts in his or her individual

name free and clear of any claim or responsibility of the other party.

10.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver any necessary documents to

transfer or affirm the title and ownership of the personal property of the parties, including
automobiles, pursuant to the Decree entered in this matter.
11.

Petitioner is awarded her name change to Veronica HyunJoo Lee.

JOHN GREEN
Attorney for Petitioner
DATED:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served on
a true and correct copy to:
John Green
Attorney at Law
39 Exchange Place, Suite 60
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

on the $i day of July, 2008.

Civil No.
054905684

Table of Contents
Amount

Terra Vista Home Proceeds

$
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Exhibit A
Respondent

FF/CL
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#12B

488,949.11

County Tax (R's Duty)
NOT IN FF/CL $
Less 1/2 Repairs
$
(3,808.04) $
Extra Principal Payments
$ (237,657.48)$
Respondent's Pre-Marital Funds NOT IN FF/CL

0.00
0.00 $
0.00 $

3,808.04
237,657.48

A) Subtotal Escrow Allocation

$

0.00 $

241,465.52

To be Divided Equally

$

247,483.59 $

123,741.79 $

123,741.80

Dining Table Set
Sony TV
Washer& Dryer
Subtotal Furnishings
2002VWGolf
Petitioner's Premarital Debts
Petitioner's Withdrawals
Attorney Fees (to P)
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(4,134.26)$
(5,137.50)$
(14,417.21)$
(29,777.29) $
2,500.00 $
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1,010.27
824.16
4,134.25
5,137.50
14,417.21
29,777.29
(2,500.00)

Attorney Fees (to R)

$

(2,117.50)$

2,117.50

B) Subtotal Reimbursements

$

(53,083.76) $

53,083.75

37,692.05 $
68,820.64 $
12,000.00 $

18,846.03 $
34,410.32 $
(6,000.00)$

(18,846.03)
(34,410.32)
6,000.00

$

47,256.35 $

(47,256.35)

488,949.10 $

117,914.38 $

R's Stock Options
R's After-Tax 401k
P's FMC A/P (AIA Plan)

$

$
$
$

C) Subtotal Stock Options* 401 (k) Pay-outs
$

371,034.72

#12C
#12C
# 12 C
#12C
#12C
#10
24
30
31

#12D
# 12 E
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Exhibit ~B~

Divorce Agreement
Between
Guenther and Veronica Jacobsen

1. Take Veronica's name off the mortgage and equity loan for the 2043 Terra Vista
property by the end of 2001, but keep both names on the property title.
2. Veronica and Isaac have the right to live in the Terra Vista property until the end of
August 2004.
2.1. Guenther will be responsible for the mortgage and equity loan payments on the
Terra Vista property through the end of August 2004.
2.2. Veronica will be responsible for the utility bills and the maintenance of and the
replacement parts for the Terra Vista property.
2.3. Repair costs for the property shall be shared equally. Each party will be
responsible for damages whoever caused them.
3. Put the Terra Vista property on the market earliest in May 2004. Sale of the Terra
Vista property shall take place after August 31 s t , 2004. The equity will be divided
equally as follows:
3.1. In the case of sale of the property:
Equity will be divided equally upon property sale closure.
3.2. In the case of pay-out on September 1 s t , 2004:
Equity will be calculated based on property sale listing price (minus closing cost)
at that time or $70K, whichever the greater amount will be paid out to Veronica
by Guenther.
4. Veronica can stay in the Terra Vista Property beyond August 2004, until the property
sale is finalized or pay out is completed. After August 2004, mortgage and equity
loan payments will be shared in the ratio of actual gross income.
5. Income tax return will be filed jointly until divorce and divided equally.
6. Upon divorce, the 401 (k) and/or pension plans of both parties for the duration of the
marriage shall be divided equally.
7. Veronica shall not seek for the alimony.

Exhibit ~C~

TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D, P.C.. #6335
A Professional Corporation
Attorney for Respondent
140 West 9000 South, Suite 9
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 566-1884
Fax: (801) 562-5151

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

VERONICA LEE JACOBSEN,

FINANCIAL DECLARATION

Petitioner,
-vsGUENTHER JACOBSEN,
Respondent.

Case No. 054905684
Judge
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

Name:

Guenther Jacobsen

Address:

6934 Well Spring Road, Apt. 9C, Midvale, Utah 84047

SSN:

647-32-8883

Occupation: Chemist
Employer:

Hexcel Corporation, 7000 West 5400 South, West Valley, Utah 84118

No. of Exemptions Claimed: 2
Birth date:
1.

7/2/47

GROSS MONTHLY INCOME:
Salary/Wages:

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME:

$ 10,071.27
$ 10,071.27

2.

ITEMIZE MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS:
$2,108.92

Federal Income Taxes
State Income Taxes

579.10

FICA

486.70

Medicare

146.03

Health Insurance

406.97
1,666.67

401 (k)

168.84

Disability and Life Ins.
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS

$5,563.23

3.

NET MONTHLY INCOME

$4,508.04

4.

DEBTS AND OBUGATIONS :NONE

Creditor's Name
Am Ex 71003 '
Zions VISA
Am Ex (corp)
5.

For
Living Exp.
Living Exp.
Business

In whose
Balance
Name
$4,637.55
Rsp.
$ 35.15
Rsp.
$1,395.45
Rsp.

Mo. Pmt.
In foil each month
In foil each month
In foil each month

PROPERTY-Sold

a.

Real estate: Marital Residence Sold
Address:
Date of acquisition:
Original Cost:
Mortgage Balance:
Mortgage Holder:
Monthly Payment:
Other Liens:
Monthly Payment:
Current value:
Basis of Valuation:

b.

Vehicles (Year, make and model)

Value

2002 Volkswagen Golf GLS
1996 Chrysler (pre-marital)

8,950.00
3,000.00

2

Balance
Owed
0.00
0.00

Cash and Deposit accounts (banks, savings & loans, credit unions-savings and checking)
Name of Institution
Account No.
Current Balance
9,109.60
10,010.85
488,949.11

Zions
123-32922-9
Zions
123-60519-8
Escrow Account-Home Sale

Checking
Savings

Securities, stocks, bonds, money market funds (other)
Current Value
Name of Institution
Account No.
$0.00
Hexcel Stock Options (pre-marital)
005291
Business Interests None
Name of Business

Current Value

Shares

f.

Other assets (include value or equity) None

6.

PROFIT SHARING OR RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS (If more than two accounts, attach sheet with identical information)
Petitioner: Name of Company/Plan name: Fresenius
Plan representative: Fidelity
Address: P. O. Box 5425, Cincinnati Ohio
Current value: $300,810.97 (estimate, excludes A-Tax)
Respondent: Name of Company: Hexcel Corporation; 40 l(k); Pension Plan (frozen 12/31/00)
Plan representative: Fidelity Investment;
Address: P. O. Box 5424; Cincinnati, OH 45250
Current value: Pension $280.67 per month (estimate)

7.

8.

LIFE INSURANCE
Name of Company
Policy No.
Hexcel

Face Amount
$290,000

MONTHLY EXPENSES:
Rent/Mortgage:
Real property taxes
Real property insurance
Maintenance
Housekeeping
Food and Household Supplies
Utilities:
Electricity

$ 1,129.00
0.00
19.00
0.00
60.00
400.00
30.00

3

Cash Value (if any)
$0.00

Natural Gas
Water, Sewer & Garbage
Telephone: (cell included and Internet)
Cemetery Expense
Cable TV
Laundry and Dry cleaning
Clothing
Medical
Dental
Entertainment
Gifts and donations
Auto expense (gas, oil, maint.., tax, license)
Auto insurance
Installment payments:
Attorney's fees
Vacation and Personal Travel Expenses
Car replacement cost

$4,812.14

TOTAL EXPENSES:
STATE OF UTAH

75.00
45.00
120.00
40.00
32.14
50.00
200.00
125.00
90.00
100.00
100.00
300.00
77.00
0.00
845.00
500.00
400.00

)

:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
I swear that all of the information contained herein is true and correct.

Responds
Subscribed and sworn to before Ae this

, cfo/

day of^U(^X

MJfft

NOTARYP

W

"" ""Notary Public

.

State of Utah

j

2006.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I employed by the offices of Terry R. Spencer, Ph.D., Attorney and
Law, counsel for Petitioner and that I caused the foregoing to be served upon Respondent by placing
a true and correct copy in a sealed envelope, addressed to:
John C. Green
John C. Green, P.C.
39 Exchange Place, Suite 60
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and depositing the same in the United States mail,firstclass postage prepaid thereon, on thec^jday
of September, 2006.

HEXCEL

|

2005 EARNINGS SUMMARY

WAGE ANALYSIS

[Total Gross Earnings
[ Group Term Life Ins Over SOK
Sec. 401(k), 403(b) and 457
Pretax Healtb, FSA & Transportation
Relocation/Moving Expense
Other Exempt Earnings/Deductions
EDCA, PARS and RSUs
Excess Social Security Wages
• 2005 REPORTED WAGES:

Box 1 Wages
198,469.79

Box 3 Wages
198,469.79

Box 5 Wages
198,469.79

-18,000.00
-37655.04

-3,055.04

-3,055.04

177,414.75

-105,414.75
90,000.00
DEDUCTIONS

EARNINGS
REGULAR
REGULAR-INDIRECT
VACATION
SICK
HOLIDAY
PERSONAL HOLIDAY
MICP
STOCK OPTION GAIN
LTIP AWARD

55,883.39
52,101.97
5,984.65
1,772.17
4,64830
464.83
27,138.00
33,492.48
16,984.00

TOTAL EARNINGS:

imp#:

86415

198,469.79 j

Process Level: DUB

3UENTHER. JACOBSEN
E.TERRA VISTA WAY
.€)Y
UT 84093-

HEALTHCARE
| HEXCEL PRETAX 401K
1 HEXCEL AFTERTAX 401K
HEXCEL PRETAX 401K
ANTHEM PPO HIGH-FLEX
DELTA DPO-FUEX
1 VSP HIGH-FLEX
JEE SUPPLIES
! FAMILY SUPP AD&D- NO
-STOCK OPTION OFFSET

TOTAL DEDUCTIONS:

Dept: 640

195,414.75 j
|
48.90 1
14,000.00
2,789.00
4,000.00
2,672.75
293.35 f
40.04
1,713.40
167.96
22,289.23

48,014.63 |
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ADVICE NUMBER:
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TcURRENTl

RATEl

CURRENT

72,00
8.001

58.10
58.10

4,183.45

IEGULAH
lOi^AY

YEAR TO DATE TYPE

464.83

67,574.32

FED IT

3,710.84 MEDICARE
4,508.83 UTSIT

lib-'

4,503.02

'ACATION

23,224.82

64.88

1,739.07

231.68

6,371.55

60.00
743.72
113.08

•401KCU

10,946.00, •MEDICAL
•DENTAL

Ttf>

YEAR TO DATE

802.77

5.840.40!

13.717.00 80CSEC
9,534.79 •FSA*H

,tCK

CURRENT

1,140.00
2.974.90|
2,148.14

11.43
3.23

•VISION
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GUENTHER JACOBSEN
6934 WELL SPRING RD *9C
MIDVALE
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I 123329229

ADVICE NUMBER:

00130591

ADVICE DATE:

09/15/2000

ACCOUNT & TYPE

AMOUNT
2J0N CX

| TOTAL DIRECT DEPOSIT
WAKNJNGJ - THE 0ACK OF THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS AN ARTIROAl WATERMARK. - HOWAJANANGIE TO VIEW.

VOID

I

2.539.791

2.539.79 ]

Exhibit ~D~

Statement of Income and Expenses
Income
Gross Monthly Income from:

]!

'Salary

Total Montly Income:| j

$4,583.00!
$4,583.00

[Monthly Deductions:
| Federal wlthhelding
OASDI
(Medicare
State w/hUT
[401 (k)
II
|
Total monthly deduction: [

$1,361.95

|

$3,221.06

Net Monthly Income: |

$744.66
$284.16
$66.45
$266.67

$0.00

Debts
Creditor's
\AME)C~
Isaac Moanres

Purpose ot
Debt
Living cost
Property Down

In whose
name
Petitioner's
Petitioner's

BaTance
Monthly
Payment
$535.86 In full
$0.00
$5,083.79

Property
[Address:
pate of acquisition:
Original cost:
Mortgage balance:
Mortgage holder:
Monthly Payment:
Other liens:
Lien holder:
Monthly Payment:
Current value:
Basis of evaluation:

|1365East Emerson Ave
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
August 10th, 2006
$330,000.00
$266,820.23
Countrywide Home Loans
| $1,800.00
$33,750.00
Countrywide Home Loans
$230.00
$330,000.00
Recently purchased

I

|

Vehicle (Year, Maker, & Model) [Value
(Balance owed
2002 Volkswagen Golf
~ ]
$6,588.00 j
$O00i
[Cash and deposit accounts
Name of Institution
JZion's Checking

401 (K)
EM Assist, Inc
Paychex
http.V/benefits.pavchex.com
Current Value: $6,543.00
Fresenius Medical Care
Fidelity Investments
P.O. Box 5424
Cincinnati, OH 45250-5424
Current Value: $40,539.99
Pharmacia Savings Plan
Fedelity Investments
P.O.Box 770003
Cincinnati. OH 45277-0065

[Account No.
[003468360

[Current Bal.
|
$749.33

Exhibit ~E

Statement of Accounts

ZIONS BANK

0

Page 1 of 3
This Statement October 7, 2004
Last Statement September 9,2004

P.O. Box 30709, Salt Lake City, UT 34130-0709

Primary Account 003448370

0003196 02 AV 0.503 "AUTO

T5 0 2208 84093-106443 02 1 ZFN PG0023 00012

GUENTHERJACOBSEN
VERONICA L JACOBSEN
2043 TERRA VISTA WAY
SANDY UT 84093-1064

DIRECT INQUIRIES TO:
24-hour Account Information:
Logan:
755-9995
Ogden:
393-9995
Provo:
375-9995
Salt Lake.
974-6800
St. George: 674*9995
1 (800) 974-8800 (outside local

llnLUIU.Lnll l l l t l l l l M I I II...LI.I..MI.U.I

Broadway Office
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2105
WE HAVENT FORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ®

SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT BALANCE
Account Type
Gold Interest Checking

£^1112^*1!":
Account Number
003448370

""
CheckinglStvfngs
Ending Balance f
$11,024.52 /

Outstanding
Balances Owed

GOLO INTEREST EHi(^IIBfl(»tt8a»
Previous Balance
10,424.76

Deposits/Credits
35,357.36

70S *2
ChaigesJDebits
4,144.42

Checks Processed
30,613.18

10 DEPOSITS/CREDITS
Date
Amount
09/17
2,461.93
09/22
9,610.65
09/23
15,763.35
09/24
2,578.79
1,734.00
09/27
09/27
286.87
09/27
248.77
09/27
209.10
10/01
2,461.92
10/07
1.98 '

Description
HEXCEL CORPORATI PR PAY 0002- REF # 011900448111680 1103320859
WIRE/IN-200426603835;ORG ZIONS BANK DUE FROM DEUTSCHE BANK;0 1603203350
DEPOSIT 0050418094 S f c o c U f l p / i ' w j
DEPOSIT 0060525751
*
~~
INTERNET XFER FROM DDA "*8360 ID: 271184721 2307014386
INTERNET XFER FROM DDA ***8360 ID: 271184833 2307014392
INTERNET XFER FROM DDA ***8360 ID: 271185051 2307014404
INTERNET XFER FROM DDA *"8360 ID: 271184936 2307014402
HEXCEL CORPORATI PR PAY 0002- REF # 011900444184263 1104377420
INTEREST PAYMENT 0001144454

10 CHARGES/DESKS
Date
Amount
09/13
37.79
09/14
1,236.98
09/14
30.00
09/20
30.59
09/22
8.00
09/27
600.00
09/27
14.10
10/01
2,000.00
10/04
149.83
10/04
37.13

Description
ATT 800-222-0300 AT&T S 2311084462001 REF # 021000022961697 1104907529
AMERICAN EXPRESS ELEC R 040913060225228REF # 031201460568055 1104050603
INTERNET XFER TO DDA *"0425 ID: 258164614 2305206283
QWEST COMM AUTO PAY 68019444718050 REF #071100265555994 1104925041
WireFee 1603203349
INTERNET XFER TO DDA ***1764 ID: 271185334 2307014407
Questar Gas Co. QGC 989285000007831 REF # 091000011369389 1104245122
Countrywide MORTGAGE REF #021000027198986 1104461858
BANKCARD CENTER PAYMENT JACOBSEN.VERONICA LEE 4388790000917 1104029512
PACIFICORP ELECTRIC C 036082947001040REF # 021200025403450 1104008443

Ending Balance
11,024.52

Statement of Accounts

ZIONS BANK*

Page 1 of 3
This Statement: July 8,2005
Last Statement: June 8,2005

P.O. Box 30709, Sail Lake City, UT 84130-0709

Primary Account 003448370

0002873 01 AV 0.278 **AUTO T1 2 1912 84093-106443 02

ZFN PG0023 00005

DIRECT INQUIRIES TO:
24-hour Account Information:
Logan:
755-9995
Ogden:
393-9995
Prove:
375-9995
Salt Lake:
974-8800
St. George: 674-9995
1 (800) 974-8800 (outside local

GUENTHER JACOBSEN
VERONICA L JACOBSEN
2043 TERRA VISTA WAY
SANDY UT 84093-1064

ll,.l..lMlll...l.ln..il....llll.H.ll...i,.l.l..l..ll.l..l.l

Broadway Office
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2105
WE HAVENT FORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ®
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SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT BALANCE

GOLD INTEREST CHECKING 003448370
Previous Balance
4,979.70 *

Ch*ckmglS*vings
Ending Balance
$6,158.09

Account Number
003448370

Account Type
Gold Interest Checking

Outstanding
BaianctsOwed

'

Deposits/Credits
28,243.79

705 «

Charges/Debits
10,634.80

Checks Processed
16,430.60

7 DEPOSITS/CREDITS
Date
Amount
06/09
19,589.23
WRG
2,595.58
06/24
2,595.58
06/24
860.79
07/05
2.87
07/08
2.595.58
07/08
4.16

Description
DEPOSIT 0050257848 Sto&U
Og+touS
HEXCELCORPORATI PR PAY 0002-REF#011200363457166
HEXCEL CORPORATI PR PAY 0002- REF # 011200365481085
HEXCEL CORPORATI INV PA E86415 REF # 011200366358688
DEPOSIT 0050453471
HEXCEL CORPORATI PR PAY 0002- REF # 011200361357307
INTEREST PAYMENT 0000965407

10 CHARGES/DEBITS
Date
Amount
06/13
39.92
06/15
2.477.90
06/20
32.04
06/27
78.65
06/28
376.13
07/01
300.00
07/05
3Z38
07/05
19.95
07/08
7,199.84
07/08
77.99

Description
ATT 800-222-0300 AT&T S 2311084462001 REF # 021000029782701 1107845520
AMERICAN EXPRESS ELEC R 050614060215815REF # 031201464022903 1104672441
QWEST COMM AUTO PAY 68019444718050 REF # 071100269882967 1104517497
Questar Gas Co. QGC 989285000087541 REF # 091000011373511 1105246495
AMERICAN EXPRESS ELEC R 050627060218184REF # 031201462115079 1104650447
INTERNET XFER TO DDA ***1764 ID: 182182341 2306512608
PACIFICORP ELECTRIC C 036082947001050REF # 021200022398827 1106316626
8ANKCARD CENTER PAYMENT JACOBSEN.VERONICA LEE 4388790000917 1106358772
INTERNET XFER TO DDA *"1764 ID. 189181255 2304610538
COMCAST COMCAST 4040160066 REF # 021000024407417 1105032487

3 CHECKS PROCESSED
Number
Date
.... Amount
1083
06/13 C/w\JLtr 16,249.93

DAILY BALANCES
Date
Amount
06/09
24,568.93
06/10
27,164.51
06/13
10.874.66

Number
1084

Date
07/07

06/15
06/20
06/24

Amount
46.67

8,396.76
8,364.72
11,821.09

Ending Balance
6,158.09

1104718238
1104216265
1104221721
1105009930

Number
1085

Date
07/08

134 00

06/27
06/28
07/01

11,742.44
11,366.31
11.066.31

